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Pinochet's Plebiscite and the Catholics: 
The Dual Role of the Chilean Chupch 
By STEPHEN R. BOWERS 
F or decades the Catholic church and the Chi-lean military embraced common concerns. 
Each was an advocate of stability, law and order, 
social harmony, and an opponent of radical po-
litical movements. Their occupation of such ex-
tensive common political, economic, and social 
ground made them natural allies. However, as 
the church, fearing the stronger attraction of 
both the Protestant faith and Marxist-Leninist 
ideology among the country's working class, 
could no longer confine itself to this limited role 
and became more politically and socially active, 
the two allies became opponents. 1 By 1975, the 
Catholic church was in the forefront of opposi-
tion to Chile's military government and was be-
coming the focal point for opposition activities. 
Yet, as Chile prepared for its plebiscite in 1988, 
the relationship between the regime and the 
church experienced yet another transformation 
from that of distinct adversaries to one of uneasy 
members of a common system, each struggling 
to define the limits of their mutual authority over 
different aspects of Chilean society. In the vola-
tile period preceding the plebiscite, the junta be-
came increasingly sensitive to clerical intrusions 
into the political sphere while the church leader-
ship, more cautious than in the earlier part of the 
decade and forced into the dual role of both ad-
vocate and adversary, endeavored to avoid secu-
lar manipulation, excessive political activism, 
and the internal dissension that could jeopardize 
the church's institutional framework and inhibit 
the role that it might play after the 5 October 
plebiscite. 
By 1986 the military regime was becoming 
increasingly cautious in dealing with the na-
tion's most important social institution. Its over-
all goal was to utilize the Catholic church as an 
instrument of regime authority or, failing that, 
to contain church opposition to Pinochet's poli-
cies. In several important respects, the junta was 
successful in manipulating the church in such a 
way as to draw clerical support from an essen-
tially reluctant church leadership. The best ex-
ample of the regime's skillful handling of the 
religious community was the visit of Pope John 
Paul II in 1987. Yet, in other instances, the gov-
ernment faced severe criticism from numerous 
church leaders and treated the church as an op-
ponent, thus intensifying its image as an oppres-
sive regime bent on consistent violation of 
human rights. At its rhetorical worst, the gov-
ernment resorted to accusations such as that of 
Interior Minister Sergio Fernandez who sug-
gested early in 1988 that the church represented 
one of the three greatest obstacles to peace in the 
country." 
As the process of Chile's democratization has 
proceeded, the relationship between the junta 
and the church has become particularly signifi-
cant as an indication of the ability of the regime 
to work with non-governmental power centers 
in guiding national development along a demo-
cratic path. The increasingly violent context of 
Chilean politics in 1987 and 1988 has served as 
a reminder of the difficulties of resolving the 
junta's troubled relationship with the society 
that it must govern both today and, should it win 
the plebiscite, in the future. It is the purpose of 
this article to examine the nature of the relation-
ship betwen the regime and the church during 
this critical period and to evaluate how each in-
stitution has dealt with the strains that have be-
come typical of Ctlilean politics. That evalua-
tion may be useful in making projections about 
the future of Chilean society in the era after the 
plebiscite. 
THE POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT 
One of the most striking indications of the in-
tense strains within Chilean society has been an 
increasing pattern of violence as the country has 
moved cautiously toward democratization. 
Most frequently associated with the recent wave 
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of terror has been the Manuel Rodriguez Patri-
otic Front (FPMR), a small group originally be-
lieved to have only 1,000 to 2,000 hardcore 
members and long associated with attacks 
against electrical, telephone, and transportation 
systems, foreign-owned banks and mining com-
panies, the U.S. Embassy, and pro-junta news-
papers. By 1986, FPMR activities had expanded 
to include not only kidnappings, but also the at-
tempt on Augusto Pinochet's life in September.3 
In November 1987, a series of terrorist actions 
against National Electric Power, Inc., appar-
ently the work of the FPMR, left a vast region 
from Copiapo to Temuco without electricity 
while simultaneous attacks against the Santiago 
bus system resulted in the burning of three 
buses. 4 In March 1988, the Chilean attorney 
general Ambrosio Rodriguez warned that there 
would be an increase in terrorist attacks as the 
date of the plebiscite approached. These under-
takings, he explained, were part of a political 
strategy aimed at inducing a so-called drug ef-
fect that would prevent people from being fully 
responsive to political events during that sensi-
tive period. By the spring, violence intensified 
as terrorists disabled the Pacifico Steel Enter-
prise railroad by planting bombs along the rail-
way line, thus causing panic among the resi-
dents of the Coquimbo region. Strikes against 
Santiago's electrical system became routine, 
with the result that vast industrial sectors of the 
city were often without power. Even radio sta-
tions served as convenient targets of terrorist ac-
tions. Although FPMR is given credit for most 
of these incidents, there were rumors of involve-
ment by the Peruvian terrorist organization 
Shining Path. As a result, the Carabineros direc-
tor general Rodolfo Stange was compelled to is-
sue a public statement in June 1988, in an effort 
to reduce popular fears of such foreign interven-
tion. According to Stange, the violent attacks on 
a Carabineros barracks in May, seen by some as 
a Shining Path action, was the work of domestic 
"extremists," probably the FPMR, who had 
promptly fled when the Chilean military came to 
the aid of the Carabineros.5 Nevertheless, Chi-
lean authorities insisted that there was consider-
able foreign support for local terrorists and Ad 
Hoc Military Prosecutor Fernando Torres sug-
gested in February 1988 that out of a group of 
over 100 cases he had tried, "at least 30 to 40 
percent have been trained in Cuba or the USSR. 
They have confessed to this and it is no secret."6 
The turbulence of this era was characterized 
not only by an increase in domestic violence but 
also by a continuation and, in some cases, an 
World Affairs 
intensification of international criticism of the 
military regime. As a result of the barrage of 
hostile pronouncements about the government, 
junta representatives have long been embroiled 
in bitter debates with numerous governments 
and international organizations, disputes likely 
to inhibit the operation of the government 
should the regime prevail in the plebiscite. The 
U.S. Department of State has been a leading 
critic of junta policies, including the plebiscite 
that served as the cornerstone of Pinochet's pro-
cess for transition to civilian rule. The official 
response to the State Department's negative as-
sessment of the plebiscite was offered by Admi-
ral Jose Toribio Merino who, in a statement in 
December 1987, suggested that it is U. S., not 
Chilean elections, that are open to criticism be-
cause of the low turnout in U.S. presidential 
elections and the inconvenient hours during 
which a person may vote.7 The United Nations 
added its voice to the chorus of international 
critics of Pinochet's regime in March 1988, with 
a resolution condemning the junta for human 
rights violations. Chile's ambassador to the 
United Nations responded to the resolution by 
denouncing it as interference in Chilean internal 
affairs and suggesting that it was motivated by 
"political interests" rather than a concern for hu-
man rights and that the resolution was "invalid 
from the beginning because it was drafted by 
such an untrustworthy government-that of 
Mexico."s Finally, in July 1988, the European 
Parliament issued a unanimous resolution call-
ing upon all Chilean democratic parties to re-
ject Pinochet in the 5 October plebiscite. The 
spokesman for the Chilean Foreign Ministry 
promptly denounced the decision as "grotesque" 
and labeled members of the Parliament "igno-
rant" and suffering from a "distorted view of 
Chilean reality."9 
THE CHURCH AS AN ADVOCATE 
The regime's difficulties with international or-
ganizations and foreign governments have been 
matched by severe strains in its relationship with 
the church since 1975. Harassment of church 
workers and even the deaths of foreign priests in 
police searches of Santiago's slums were indica-
tions of open and bitter official hostility toward 
the church. This attitude was dramatically re-
flected in actions against church organizations 
such as the Vicariate of Solidarity-the Catho-
lic church's human rights office. Pinochet him-
self described this organization as "more com-
munistic than the communists." Apparently in 
retaliation for the Vicariate's accusations of hu-
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man rights violations, numerous anonymous at-
tacks were directed against church buildings, 
clergy, and lay workers. In addition, church 
workers were often the targets of bombings, 
threats, kidnappings, and beatings. 10 
Yet, in spite of the extremely harsh church-
regime relationship that developed since 1975, 
the visit of Pope John Paul II in 1987 demon-
strated Pinochet's ability to back away from 
overt and sometimes violent confrontations with 
the church and to utilize that organization, indi-
rectly at least, as an advocate of his policies. 
While there were papal gestures that supported 
the opposition, the pope gave significant indica-
tions of support for the regime. The pope's criti-
cal gestures fell into four categories: meetings 
with opposition leaders, demands for greater 
popular participation in politics, a call for an as-
sertive church, and recognition of the Vicariate 
of Solidarity for its "devotion on behalf of l1U-
man rights." Yet, these indications of support for 
Pinochet's opponents were balanced by a series 
of actions clearly supportive of the regime. One 
of the most important symbolic moves during 
the papal visit was the pope's appearance on the 
presidential balcony with Pinochet and his fam-
ily and his prayers that were offered with the 
general and his family. In addition, the pope 
echoed at least some of Pinochet's anticommun-
ist sentiments before an audience of bishops and 
priests with his denunciation of "foreign influ-
ences" that are attempting to "subjugate or dis-
tort the national will." Finally, after listening to 
shanty town delegates at a mass rally, the pope 
cautioned grassroots church organizations to 
avoid taking direct political positions. As the 
visit ended there was general recognition that it 
had made the split within the church a matter of 
public attention while the attendant disturbances 
did more harm to the image of opposition 
groups than to that of the government. The 
words of comfort that the pope gave to the gov-
ernment had greater impact in promoting more 
cautious church behavior than those remarks 
that might have supported the opposition. I I 
THE SUPPRESSION OF LIBERAL 
TENDENCIES 
The relationship between the ecclesiastical 
leadership and the Vicariate of Solidarity has 
demonstrated the shift in church policy in recent 
years. The activities of this organization exem-
plify the attitude of the more liberal element of 
the church leadership toward the military re-
gime. The Vicariate has championed the cause 
of human rights by criticizing official abuses and 
by offering aid-food, shelter, clothing, and le-
gal support-to victims of abuse. At the same 
time, it has defended the poor and preached its 
own brand of liberation theology, which stresses 
the need for Catholics to become involved in 
movements for social justice. A few Vicariate 
associates, such as former member Ignacio Gu-
tierrez, have even advocated the desirability of 
revolution, thus prompting the Chilean interior 
minister's 1988 charge that the Vicariate is a 
"counterintelligence organization at the service 
The suppression of liberal tendencies within the 
church-something which was facilitated by the 
church hierarchy-was accompanied by govern-
mental pressures against elements of the church 
media. 
of the opposition" and dedicated to providing 
moral and logistical support for terrorism. 12 
However, by 1986 the Vicariate faced a more 
cautious church leadership that seemed inclined 
to return to a more "pastoral" mission. The de-
mand by Bishop Antonio Moreno, vicar of the 
northern zone of Santiago since 1986, that 
priests not participate in any form of protest 
against the government is typical of the position 
taken by many of the more recently appointed 
church leaders. When a group of lay people 
went to Bishop Moreno to describe a brutal 
search and seizure raid in their neighborhood, 
the bishop responded that the soldiers and the 
police were "only doing their duty and obeying 
the laws." This cautious attitude undoubtedly 
reflected a concern about the alienation of tradi-
tional Catholics who have played such an impor-
tant role in supporting the church and making it 
possible for church structures to serve those in 
need of assistance. It is, of course, important to 
note that the Catholic church is not a monolithic 
body either at the popular or at the elite level. 
Disagreements over fundamental political ques-
tions exist at every level of the organization and 
thus mandate caution on the part of ecclesiasti-
cal leaders who are concerned about the institu-
tional solidity of the church. 
The suppression of liberal tendencies within 
the church-something which was facilitated 
by the church hierarchy-was accompanied by 
governmental pressures against elements of the 
church media. One of the most important media 
reflections of liberal tendencies within the 
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church is the monthly political journal Analisis, 
published by the Academy of Christian Human-
ism. The Academy, founded in 1975, is a church 
organization that supports the research of nu-
merous social scientists suppressed by the junta. 
While Analisis continues to serve as a reminder 
of the residual vestiges of a free press in Chile, 
it has been the target of numerous attacks by 
government officials stung by its critical com-
mentary. With the approach of the plebiscite, 
authorities became increasingly sensitive to crit-
ical reportage. In June 1988, Valparaiso Naval 
Prosecutor Miguel Angel Munoz used the mili-
tary justice code to take legal action against the 
journal for its publication of an article dealing 
with the Chilean arms trade, arresting both the 
deputy director of the magazine and the author 
of the offending article. Analisis director, Juan 
Pablo Cardenas, was already serving a limited 
jail sentence for having "offended" President 
Pinochet. 13 The campaign against the Catholic 
media has also been directed against Radio La 
Voz de la Costa, a Catholic radio station that 
broadcasts educational programs to peasants 
and other rural residents. In February 1988, 
sponsors of the radio station were asked to can-
cel their contracts with the station unless they 
wanted to face reprisals. This request was evi-
dently made on behalf of the ultra-rightist terror-
ist group "Chilean Anticommunist Action" 
(ACHA) and was coupled with a death threat 
sent by letter to the priest who runs the station. 
In March, the shop of one of the radio station's 
sponsors was bombed in retaliation for its con-
tinued support for La Voz de la Costa. Chilean 
human rights attorneys claim that ACHA is 
closely linked with Chile's security services. 
These actions should be viewed not simply as 
attacks on the church, but rather as part of what 
Jaime Moreno Laval, president of the Santiago 
Journalists Association, describes as a con-
certed campaign of threats and pressure against 
journalists as the date for the plebiscite ap-
proaches. 14 
Authorities have, however, needed more than 
the mere silencing of critical elements within the 
church-supported media. On the eve of the pleb-
iscite, authorities enjoyed at least some success 
in drawing expressions of support from clerical 
figures. Given the importance of the plebiscite 
as an element of Pinochet's policies, the regime 
has been eager to solicit support from prominent 
church figures, thus in advance strengthening 
the position of the junta should it be successful 
in the plebiscite. An important measure of such 
support came in July 1988 when the Episcopal 
Wodd Affairs 
Conference president, Msgr. Carlos Gonzales, 
generally seen as sympathetic to liberal church 
elements, met with the director of Chile's Voting 
Service to review measures being taken in prep-
aration for the plebiscite. Following the meet-
ing, Gonzales declared that he was favorably 
impressed by the long lists of registered voters, 
the computer equipment, and the supplies of pa-
per for printing secret ballots and felt that they 
were clear evidence that the electoral process 
was well organized and secure against any form 
of fraud. The director of the Voting Service, 
Juan Ignacio Garcia, in turn, expressed the gov-
ernment's deep satisfaction with his observation 
that "the fact that a church authority expressed 
his support for the system is satisfying" and is "a 
positive message to all Chileans." 15 
An important reason for the change in the 
church's recent pronouncements-in addition 
to some of the papal pronouncements in the 
1987 visit-is the changing composition of rul-
ing ecclesiastical bodies, entities that were once 
dominated by regime critics but are now bal-
anced between liberals and conservatives. The 
evenness of the split within the church leader-
ship is reflected in the almost even liberal-
conservative division within the twenty-nine 
member Bishop's Council. Although Juan Fran-
cisco Cardinal Fresno Larrain, archbishop of 
Santiago since 1983, was a theological conserv-
ative and an enthusiastic supporter of the mili-
tary regime, he and the Bishop's Council have 
sometimes taken positions that advocate the 
causes espoused by Chile's opposition. For ex-
ample, in 1986 the bishops joined in the call for 
a general strike against the government by 
unions and professional groups. Cardinal 
Fresno has been equally outspoken in his de-
mands for changes in the Pinochet constitution 
and for a transition from military to civilian 
rule. Yet, the council cannot be regarded as a 
captive of the liberal faction of the leadership. 
The proposal that Cardinal Fresno made in 1985 
for a national accord is based on a formula that 
would favor the nation's center-right political 
groups at the expense of the left, something that 
pleases the government far more than the activ-
ists among the poor and the working class who 
see the left as their champion. The tendency of 
the council to fluctuate between the postures of 
advocate and adversary illustrates the desire of 
the clerical leadership to occupy a more bal-
anced position. 16 
Late in 1986, Cardinal Fresno's criticism of 
the government was softened even more by ac-
tions that many see, at best, as supportive of a 
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restrained church role or, at worst, as an effort to 
ally the church with Pinochet. This shift away 
from overt antigovernmental activism became 
most apparent following the imposition of a 
state of siege after the attempt on Pinochet's life 
on 7 September 1986. Indicative of this less crit-
ical posture was Cardinal Fresno's decision to 
proceed with the traditional 'Te Deum" celebra-
tion in Santiago's cathedral on 18 September, 
Chile's independence day. Even though a large 
sector of the clergy and laity called for a suspen-
sion of the celebration because of regime attacks 
against the church, Cardinal Fresno summoned 
the Santiago clergy to announce that the 
church's mission was "transcendent" and that 
two-hundred-year-old traditions such as the "Te 
Deum" should not be broken in response to 
passing political controversies. This ceremony, 
which was attended by General Pinochet and 
several junta members, was denounced by the 
Chilean liberation theologian, Ronaldo Munoz, 
who described it as the shepherds marching 
"into the plaza arm in arm with the wolves that 
are scattering and destroying the flock." 17 Real-
istically, it must be recognized that these actions 
have not constituted a "sell-out" on the part of 
the church leadership, but are, rather, important 
steps toward facilitation of a constructive church 
role in Chile after the plebiscite, regardless of 
the outcome. 
THE CHURCH AS AN ADVERSARY 
Yet, with the approach of the plebiscite and in 
spite of these conciliatory gestures, the church 
did not abandon its adversarial role and ex-
pressed critical views on fundamental political 
questions. One of the most important of these 
was the moral validity of the plebiscite itself. In 
spite of some praise for the electoral machinery, 
in June 1988 the Episcopal Conference released 
a statement of its concern that certain other more 
essential conditions should be met for the plebi-
scite to be considered morally valid. The first 
condition was that the opposition must be given 
more access to the media, especially the na-
tional television channel. Most independent ob-
servers agreed with the suggestion that the 
fifteen minutes of television time allocated for 
both opposition and pro-regime groups each 
evening, an arrangement that did not even begin 
until September, would not be sufficient or fair 
in view of the government's formal domination 
of the television broadcast system. It was also 
important, the statement continued, that the 
states of exception, with the limits they imposed 
upon political liberties, be lifted so there could 
be free and open debate. Furthermore, accord-
ing to the conference, government officials and 
members of the armed forces who were respon-
sible for management of the electoral machinery 
should not simultaneously be active supporters 
of a specific plebiscite option. Finally, the "ag-
gressive, disqualifying, and exclusionary lan-
guage" associated with public discussion of the 
plebiscite should be eliminated in order to main-
tain the air of calm deliberation required for an 
orderly and peaceful plebiscite. In this context, 
one is reminded of the numerous statements-
such as that by Interior Minister Sergio Fernan-
dez in March 1988-that "political anarchy, so-
cial disorder, and insecurity" would follow a 
plebiscite vote rejecting the government candi-
date. Further and even more explicit distrust of 
the plebiscite process was expressed by Carlos 
Camus, Bishop of Linares and a former secre-
tary general of the Episcopal Conference, who, 
when asked about General Pinochet's statement 
that he would "overwhelm" the opposition in the 
plebiscite, asked, "What is he going to over-
whelm them with, I wonder? Will it be with 
votes or with machinegunsT 18 
An equally fundamental issue upon which 
church leaders also made direct critical com-
ments was General Pinochet's political future. 
In January 1988, Msgr. Raul Silva Henriquez, 
Santiago's retired archbishop who presently 
holds the office of cardinal, observed that Pin-
ochet did not want to relinquish his office and, in 
all probability, would prefer to die as a dictator. 
According to Cardinal Silva, Pinochet's days are 
numbered because he will not be allowed to re-
main in office and if, upon being defeated in the 
plebiscite, he leaves Chile he will be killed. This 
was evidently a sensitive point within Pinochet's 
inner political circle and, according to some re-
ports, in the event of a defeat, the general would 
not leave the country but rather take refuge on 
Robinson Crusoe Island, a remote Chilean pos-
session in the Pacific. Following Msgr. Silva's 
comments, the Chilean Foreign Ministry filed a 
formal complaint with the Vatican against the 
Cardinal and denounced his remarks as "not 
conducive to national harmony," while Sergio 
Onofre Jarpa, president of the pro-Pinochet Na-
tional Renewal party, described them as "incred-
ible." Cardinal Silva had already demonstrated 
his disdain for Pinochet by refusing to send 
Christmas greetings to the general, instead 
sending formal Christmas messages to the rel-
atives of five young communists who had 
disappeared in September 1987. ACHA has 
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claimed credit for abducting the five. In Febru-
ary 1988, ACHA threatened to kill Cardinal 
Silva because of his public statements about hu-
man rights violations in Chile. 19 
The growing number of disappearances 
among the ranks of those expressing opposition 
to the junta was yet another issue about which 
the church was increasingly outspoken. In April 
1988, the Vicariate issued a statement in which 
it declared that the worst cases of human rights 
violations in Chile were the increased campaign 
The church has played a dual role in that 
sometimes it has been an advocate of regime 
politics, while on other occasions it has been a 
critic. 
of political kidnappings and the arrest and tor-
ture of people in secret detention centers run by 
the National Intelligence Center (CNI). The 
Santiago Archbishop's Office charged that the 
methods employed and the timing of events sup-
ported fears that the repressive tactics of the 
early Pinochet years were being revived as the 
country neared the date of the plebiscite. Cardi-
nal Juan Francisco Fresno and his close advisors 
stressed that the Catholic church could not re-
main indifferent to such events and that finding 
the missing should be one of the highest public 
priorities. 20 
The church's pursuit of a restrained adversar-
ial role was not without its costs for those lead-
ers associated with public statements of opposi-
tion to regime policies and practices. In May 
1988, four priests who signed a document which 
asserted that General Pinochet and the military 
regime were "morally disqualified" to rule Chile 
and called upon Pinochet to resign were arrested 
by a Santiago military prosecutor. Episcopal 
Conference president Carlos Gonzales, widely 
viewed as a supporter of the more liberal line, 
was the target of bitter personal attacks in a 
seventeen-page publication signed by Chilean 
Catholic Action, an organization of pro-
Pinochet Catholics. Death threats, such as that 
made by ACHA against Cardinal Silva, were an-
other frequent consequence of the leadership's 
adversarial functions. Even petty vandalism-
such as the assault with red paint on the home 
and automobile of the executive direct of the Vi-
cariate of Solidarity in October 1987-was em-
World Affairs 
ployed against those who criticized the junta's 
abuses. 21 
Yet, it is clear that while the church was will-
ing to oppose the regime on issues that have 
moral implications, particularly the human 
rights abuses cited above, it does not seek polit-
ical power for itself. Although it has emerged as 
the most important nongovernmental institution 
since 1973, it shows no desire to assume the role 
of a "shadow government" or an auxiliary state 
apparatus. It is sometimes an adversary but 
never an aspirant for political authority. The de-
termination of clerical leaders to avoid direct in-
volvement in secular matters was reflected in the 
Episcopal Conference's June 1988 declaration 
of neutrality in the plebiscite. In addition, when 
Bolivian groups requested clerical mediation in 
the Bolivian-Chilean sea-outlet issue in May 
1988, the church leadership was quick to deny 
any authority to engage in such an action, once 
again stressing that the Catholic church has no 
aspirations for direct political authority, espe-
cially on questions that lack profound, direct 
moral implications. 22 
THE LIMITS OF POLITICAL 
ACTIVISM 
Over the years, the ecclesiastical leadership 
seems to have arrived at a consensus with regard 
to the limits to political activism. A key point of 
that consensus is that prophetic statements by 
themselves are not likely to bring about a funda-
mental change in the regime. As Brian H. Smith 
has observed, the institutional resources of the 
Catholic church were more important than its 
moral voice in alleviating the effects of repres-
sive government, meaning that its role as an ad-
vocate of acceptance of the regime could bring 
important benefits to its parishioners. Accord-
ingly, by avoiding elite-level confrontations 
with the regime, the church has been able to fo-
cus on providing important services, such as 
communications networks and legal and eco-
nomic assistance, to those who have been vic-
tims of repression. Thus, the role of the church 
has been enlarged rather than diminished under 
the military regime, and the Catholic leadership 
has drawn closer to an understanding with re-
gard to the limits of the clerical political activ-
ism characteristic of its adversarial role. When 
newly appointed Bishop Jorge Medina went to 
Pinochet to reaffirm his loyalty to the regime, he 
was making a dramatic statement of the self-
imposed limits that now apply to the church's 
role in politics. Yet, that loyalty does not imply 
subservience or a willingness on the part of the 
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church to allow its leadership to be under-
mined. 23 
This understanding is clearly the result of a 
realistic evaluation of the church's mission by 
the ecclesiastical hierarchy-especially the Vat-
ican leadership, which has recently appointed 
conservative bishops who are more supportive 
of the government-rather than a consequence 
of direct military pressure against the church. 
The exercise of restraint by both the church and 
the junta, which generally refrained from direct 
threats to the core interests of the Catholic 
church, is a tribute to the political wisdom of 
both the Chilean military figures who act as po-
litical leaders and the ecclesiastical figures who 
enjoy political prominence. When Bishop Me-
dina made his journey to Pinochet, he was re-
warded for his expression of support by a cere-
mony in which the dictator presented him with a 
pectoral cross made of lapis lazuli. After all, 
military authorities can accept a church that en-
gages in an active pastoral mission but refrains 
from direct plays for secular authority even if it 
does venture into the political sphere when it 
sees a moral issue at stake. Yet, the church's po-
litical role remains modest and restrained, thus 
protecting its ecclesiastical structure and allow-
ing the church to serve its parishioners-includ-
ing those who have been victims of the regime's 
repression. 
CONCLUSIONS 
Policies of the Catholic church in the period 
just prior to the plebiscite were not a sell-out, 
but rather an effort to facilitate a transition to 
democratic government and avoid the violence 
that might be associated with a left-wing over-
throw of the Pinochet government. The church 
has played a dual role in that sometimes it has 
been an advocate of regime policies while on 
other occasions it has been a critic. On balance, 
clerical leaders are most concerned about pur-
suit of a policy that allows maximum attention 
to the needs of parishioners while also directing 
attention to political controversies when crucial 
moral questions are at issue. 
A crucial factor stimulating adoption of this 
approach is that, by 1987 and 1988, the core 
interests of the church were not being threatened 
by the junta. The worst excesses of earlier years 
had stopped and, while they occurred on an oc-
casional basis, direct physical threats and ha-
rassment were not a dominant part of regime 
tactics for dealing with the church. The achieve-
ment of better relations with the church supports 
the view that Pinochet is one of the region's 
most adroit politicians and his skill in dealing 
with the church in this period is a tribute to his 
political acumen. In spite of serious disputes be-
tween the government and the church, Pinochet 
was able to maintain contacts with the church 
leadership. At the same time, while Pinochet 
was critical of the activities of the Vicariate as 
well as of activist priests who attempted to mo-
bilize the opposition, the junta did not endeavor 
to destroy the church leadership or intrude di-
rectly into the management of the church. 
A less perceptive government might have 
concentrated on attempting to undermine the 
church by attacking its bases of economic or fi-
nancial support. There is no indication today of 
a serious official effort to undermine the church 
in such a fashion. In short, the Chilean govern-
ment may have been in the hands of the military, 
but the responsible officers recognized the fun-
damentals of Chilean history with the prominent 
role assigned to the church and did not brutally 
defy tradition. By pursuing a more restrained 
policy toward the church, Pinochet was able to 
maintain the appearance of a loyal, practicing 
Catholic whose main desire was that the church 
give more attention to pastoral concerns than to 
political issues. He did not challenge the special 
position of the church as a common element in 
Chilean life and an integral part of the nation's 
Hispanic heritage. Such an approach was not 
only a critical element of regime policy prior to 
the plebiscite but crucial to Pinochet's prospects 
for governing with any measure of success in the 
event of a "yes" vote in October. For the Catho-
lic church, maintenance of a qualified truce with 
the government was essential to the leadership's 
hopes of performing both a pastoral and a hu-
manitarian mission in the years following the 
plebiscite. 
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